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TORTS- MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS:
IMMUNITY FOR INJURIES SUFFERED
ON ANY MUNICIPALITIES' PUBLIC LAND ALLOWED
BY THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT
Olson & Howard v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation District,
2002 ND 61, 642 N.W.2d 864
I. FACTS
On November 26, 2000, Kathleen A. Olson (Olson) and Amy Howard
(Howard) went sledding down a hill at Tom 0' Leary Golf Course.' The
golf course is owned, operated, and maintained by the Bismarck Parks and
Recreation District (hereinafter the BPRD).2 During the winter season,
approximately 100 acres of the Tom O'Leary Recreational Complex were
open to the general public for winter activities such as sledding, snow-
boarding, tobogganing, and cross-country skiing. 3 The BPRD charged no
admission or fee for entry to the area.4 The topography of the hill was
never altered from its natural condition, nor was it groomed or maintained
for sledding.5 A natural creek and creek bed runs perpendicular to the bot-
tom part of the hill near where the plaintiffs were sledding.6 No warning
signs or barriers of any kind pointed out the hill's conditions or presence of
the creek.7 The creek bed was not visible from the top of the hill.8 How-
ever, at the top of the hill, there were several clear and visibly posted signs
that cautioned visitors.9
Olson suffered serious injuries and Howard suffered permanent injuries
as a result of a sledding accident on the hill.10 Howard suffered broken





6. Brief for Appellant at 3, Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 642
N.W.2d 864 (No. 20010249).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The signs stated: "SLIDE AT YOUR OWN RISK," "NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR
ACCIDENTS," "WARNING: INJURY MAY RESULT FROM HIGH SPEEDS," and "USE
EXTREME CAUTION." Id. at 3-4.
10. Id. at 4.
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bones and a serious spinal injury that left her paralyzed below the waist."
She was hospitalized for a period of approximately six weeks.12 Because
the injuries that Howard sustained were life altering, she was required to go
to Colorado for spinal rehabilitation. 13 After the accident, Howard was con-
fined to a wheelchair.14 Olson suffered broken bones, scrapes, and bruises.15
Subsequently, Olson and Howard sued the BPRD in Burleigh County
District Court for negligently failing to maintain the sledding area-not en-
suring safe and hazard-free conditions.16 In a motion for partial summary
judgment, Olson and Howard contended that the recreational immunity stat-
utes were unconstitutional because they violated equal protection rights.17
The BPRD also moved for summary judgment.1 8 It asked the district
court to dismiss the suit based on the recreational use immunity statutes of
the North Dakota Century Code.19 Section 53-08-02 states that a landowner
has no duty to keep land safe for entry or use by others for recreation.20
North Dakota grants recreational immunity to any owner of land who
invites or permits any person to use the property without charge for recrea-
tion purposes. 21 North Dakota does not require landowners to provide a
warning of any dangerous condition on their land.22
The trial court determined that the recreational use immunity statutes
were constitutional, awarded the BPRD's motion for summary judgment,
and dismissed the lawsuit.23 Because Olson and Howard claimed the North
Dakota recreational use immunity statute was unconstitutional and violated
their equal protection rights, the question presented to the court was one of
law, 24 fully reviewable on appeal by a de novo standard. 25 Olson and
11. Telephone Interview with Orell D. Schmitz, Attorney for plaintiffs, Schmitz, Moench &





16. Olson v. Bismarck Park & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 5 3, 642 N.W.2d 864, 865.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 53-08).
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-02. Section 53-08-02 states that "an owner of land owes no
duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes or to
give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons
entering for such purposes." Id.
21. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-03 (1999).
22. Id.
23. Olson v. Bismarck Park & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, T 3, 642 N.W.2d 864, 866.
24. Id. TT 3-4 (citing State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, 9, 598 N.W.2d 147, 151).
25. Burr, 5 9, 598 N.W.2d at 151.
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Howard were entitled to appeal the summary judgment to the North Dakota
Supreme Court. 26
After analyzing the language of the recreational use immunity statutes,
the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the statutes did not violate
the equal protection provision of the North Dakota Century Code.27 The
court then affirmed summary judgment and dismissed the complaint of
Olson and Howard.28 The court held that the BPRD was immune for the
recreational use of its property under the North Dakota Century Code.29
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Prior to 1995, the North Dakota Century Code did not specifically
distinguish public landowners from private landowners. 30 In North Dakota
cases prior to 1995, courts held that political subdivisions did not qualify
for immunity under the recreational use immunity statutes. 31 In 1995, the
Legislature amended the Century Code to expressly limit the liability for all
owners of recreational lands.32 Land was interpreted to include public and
private land. 33 Recreational purpose was also narrowed, and the definition
now only includes activities "engaged in for the purpose of exercise,
relaxation, pleasure or education." 34
A. HISTORY OF SECTIONS 53-08-02 AND 53-08-05 OF THE NORTH
DAKOTA CENTURY CODE
Section 53-08-02 of the North Dakota Century Code was enacted in
1965 by the Legislature to "encourage landowners to allow the general
public access to land and water areas and other property for recreational
purposes by limiting their liability toward such users." 35 Section 53-08-05
also was enacted in 1965 in response to the developing trend of allowing
the public access to land and water areas of private landowners. 36
26. Olson, $ 4, 642 N.W.2d at 866.
27. Id. 17, 642 N.W.2d at 871 (citing N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21).
28. Id. 1 1,642 N.W.2d at 865.
29. Id.
30. Id. J 8, 642 N.W.2d at 867.
31. Id. (citing Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, 8, 17, 563 N.W.2d 384, 386-
88).
32. 1995 N.D. Laws 162, § 7.
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-01(2) (1999).
34. Id. § 53-08-01(4).
35. 1965 N.D. Laws 337, § 2.
36. Id. Section 53-08-05 stated in relevant part:
[w]illful and malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use,
structure, or activity; or injury suffered in any case when the owner of land charges the
2003)
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Virtually every state in the United States has a similar statute that limits
a landowner's personal injury liability toward people who are hurt using the
land for recreational purposes. 37 The statutes were enacted by states as an
attempt to diminish the rising number of landowners who withdrew their
land from recreational access. 38
1. The Recreational Use Immunity Chapter of the North Dakota
Century Code
Provisions of chapter 53-08 of the North Dakota Century Code state in
relevant part: "An owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises
safe for entry or use by others for recreational purpose or to give any warn-
ing of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to
persons entering for such purposes." 39 Section 53-08-03 further describes
the limited liability of landowners by explaining that a landowner's invita-
tion to use his or her land does not grant that person any guarantees about
the land's safety.40 This section further states that an owner of land who
either directly or indirectly invites any person to use the property for recrea-
tional purposes does not thereby: 1) offer any assurances about the safety of
the land, 2) give any duty of care to those using the land, or 3) assume any
responsibility or liability for any injuries that a person may receive while on
the land.41
Each year the Committee of State Officials on Suggested State Legis-
lation creates draft bills, statements, and suggestions on an array of matters
of interest to the states. 42 The Council of State Governments, through the
annual Suggested State Legislation, then presents these proposals to the
person or persons who enter or go on the land other than any amount paid to the owner
of the land by the state.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-05 (1965).
37. Robin C. Miller, Annotation, Effect of Statute Limiting Landowner's Liability for Person-
al Injury to Recreational User, 47 A.L.R. 4TH 262, § 2A (1986) (reporting states of Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Nebraska, Nevada,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming for a total of forty-three jurisdic-
tions represented). However, forty-nine states, with the exception of North Carolina, have recrea-
tional use immunity statutes. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-2-3 (2001); MO. REV. STAT. §
537.345 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 53-08 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 32-6-5 (2001); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28 § 5793 (2003).
38. 62 AM. JUR. 2d Premises Liability § 119 (1990).
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-02 (1999).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-03 (1999).
41. Id.
42. 24 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, PUBLIC
RECREATION OF PRIVATE LANDS: LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY 1 (1965).
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states. 43 A single state's experience in a new field frequently leads to the
embracing of comparable action in others. 44 In 1965, the Committee pub-
lished its annual publication, addressing public recreation on private lands
and limitations of liability.45 The suggested state legislation, in regard to
liability limitations of public recreation on private land, encouraged land-
owners to make their land and water areas available to the public.46 The
Committee further proposed that a landowner owed no duty to keep his or
her premises safe for entry or use by others and did not assume responsi-
bility for any injury.47 The publication proposed an entire legislative sec-
tion for states, which North Dakota utilized when it created its recreational
use immunity statutes.48
North Dakota's recreational use immunity statutes include specific
language that designate when land use by the public does not protect private
landowners with limited liability.49 The Legislature has changed the lan-
guage from the statutes original enactment over time. 50 Representative
Bateman sponsored the act to amend and reform the recreational use
immunity statutes. 51
2. The Language of Section 53-08-05, Failure to Warn Against
Dangerous Conditions-Charge to Enter, of the North Dakota
Century Code
Section 53-08-05 of the North Dakota Century Code explains the
limited liability of landowners toward the public utilizing their land.52 The
43. Id. "[Tihe Council's Committee on Suggested State Legislation is composed entirely of
state officials-Commissioners on Interstate Cooperation, Commissioners on Uniform State Law,
Attorneys General, legislators, legislative staff of the states, and others." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 151. The Committee also defined what constituted land as the following: "Land
means land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings,
structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.; Fastow v. Burleigh County Water Res. Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 507 (N.D.
1987).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-05 (1999).
50. Stokka v. Cass County Elec. Coop. Inc., 373 N.W.2d 911, 916-17 (N.D. 1985); see also
1993 N.D. Laws 503, § 1.
51. H.R. 2127, 54thLeg. (N.D. 1995).
52. N.D. Cent. Code § 53-08-05; see also 1993 N.D. Laws 503, § 1. Section 53-08-05 states:
Nothing in this chapter limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists for:
Willful and malicious failure to guard to warn against a dangerous condition,
use, structure, or activity; or
Injury suffered in any case when the owner of land charges the person or persons
who enter or go on the land other than the amount, if any, paid to the owner of
the land by the state.
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section allows liability for failure to warn against dangerous conditions. 53
The Legislature first amended the language of section 53-08-05(1) in 1993
from "[w]illful or malicious" to "[w]illful and malicious." 54 When
analyzing conduct that falls within recreational use immunity, the court
must evaluate if the landowner was "[w]illful and malicious" in failing to
guard or warn against a dangerous condition. 55 Naturally, the court had a
different interpretation prior to the Legislature's amendments to the
recreational use immunity statutes. 56
North Dakota's recreational use immunity statutes have changed sever-
al times since the original enactment in 1965.57 Early on, political sub-
divisions were immune from civil action liability. 58 Since the original 1965
enactment of recreational use immunity, the court and the Legislature have
revisited the issue of political subdivision immunity several times with
mixed results. 59
B. PRIOR NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT CASES
The North Dakota Supreme Court has previously heard arguments
regarding the legality and applicability of the recreational use immunity
statutes.60 The court's reasoning behind recreational use immunity has
changed over the years. 61 The court has changed interpretations back and
forth because of the addition of "political subdivisions" and the varied
language of the recreational use immunity statutes from their original
form.62
N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-05.
53. Id.
54. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 5 8, 642 N.W.2d 864, 867
(citing 1993 N.D. Laws 503, § 1) (emphasis added).
55. Stokka v. Cass County Elec. Coop. Inc., 373 N.W.2d 911, 916-17 (N.D. 1985) (emphasis
added).
56. Olson, 2002 ND 61, 1 8, 14, 642 N.W.2d 864, 867.
57. Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95,1 16, 563 N.W.2d 384, 388.
58. Fastow v. Burleigh County Water Res. Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 507 (N.D. 1987).
59. Id. at 505; see also Hovland, 4, 7, 563 N.W.2d 384, 386; Bulman v. State of North
Dakota, 521 N.W.2d 632, 640 (N.D. 1994); Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 801 (N.D.
1974).
60. See generally Fastow, 415 N.W.2d 505 (discussing liability of political subdivisions
under chapter 53-08 of the North Dakota Century Code). See also Hovland, 1, 563 N.W.2d at
385 (N.D. 1997) (same).
61. See, e.g., Hovland, 517-12, 563 N.W.2d at 387-88.
62. 1993 N.D. Laws 503, § 1.
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1. Immunity of Political Subdivisions
With the enactment of the recreational use immunity statutes in 1965,
"political subdivisions enjoyed governmental immunity from liability in all
civil actions." 63 In 1974, the North Dakota Supreme Court put an end to
governmental immunity for political subdivisions in Kitto v. Minot Park
District.64
In Kitto, the court ruled that North Dakota's political subdivisions were
subject to suits for damages to people injured by negligence or wrongful
acts by the subdivisions' agents and employees.65 Following the decision in
Kitto, the North Dakota Legislature responded and enacted chapter 32-12.1
of the North Dakota Century Code.66 Section 32-12.1-03(1) of the Century
Code states the following:
Each political subdivision is liable for money damages for injuries
when the injuries are proximately caused by the negligence or
wrongful act or omission of any employee acting within the scope
of the employee's employment or office under circumstances
where the employee would be personally liable to a claimant in
accordance with the laws of this state, or injury caused from some
condition or use of tangible property, real, or personal, under
circumstances where the political subdivision, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant.67
The provision stated that a political subdivision would only be liable for
injuries caused from a condition or use of real property as a private
individual owner of recreational land would be for these same injuries.68
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Umpleby v. United States,69
determined that North Dakota's recreational use immunity statutes applied
to the United States Army Corps of Engineers by way of the Federal Torts
Claims Act (FTCA).70 The FTCA test was used to determine whether a
63. Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 507. Michael Fastow was swimming at McDowell Dam and
dove into the water in the designated swimming area, injuring his spinal cord and rendering him a
quadriplegic. Id. The Water District and Park claimed immunity. Id.
64. 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974).
65. Kitto, 224 N.W.2d at 799-800.
66. Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 508; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(1) (Supp. 2003).
67. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(1).
68. Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 508.
69. 806 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1986).
70. See Umpleby, 806 F.2d at 813-14 (concluding the protection of the recreational use im-
munity statutes applied to political subdivisions, but held the political subdivision had waived
immunity by purchasing liability insurance). The Federal Torts Claims Act states that the United
States is liable for tort claims "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances." Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2003).
2003]
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private individual would be responsible for similar negligence under the
laws of the state where the act(s) took place. 71 Thus, the liability of a politi-
cal subdivision under the statutes was limited to the extent that private citi-
zens would be held liable for accidents or damages suffered on their
property. 72
In Umpleby, when the court applied such a test, North Dakota's recrea-
tional use immunity statutes, the same way that a private citizen would be
shielded, limited the liability of the Army Corps of Engineers.7 3 Similar
language under subsection (a) of section 32-12.1-03 makes chapter 53-08
applicable to political subdivisions and limits their liability to the same
extent as a private citizen.74
In 1987, the North Dakota Supreme Court heard Fastow v. Burleigh
County Water Resource District,75 revisiting the issue of recreational use
immunity statutes.76 The court was faced with a new and undeveloped area
when it decided whether the recreational use immunity chapter applied to
political subdivisions. 77 Fastow affirmed that the legislative intent of the
recreational use immunity statutes was to encourage private landowners to
make their property available to the public for recreational use and
emphasized that the Legislature did not expect the statute to extend to
political subdivisions.78
Various jurisdictions have interpreted recreational use immunity stat-
utes similar to North Dakota and have concluded that such laws do not
provide any liability limitations on a governmental body. 79 However, the
North Dakota Supreme Court was not persuaded by Mrs. Fastow's
71. Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957).
72. Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 508; N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 53-08 (1999).
73. Umpleby, 806 F.2d at 815.
74. Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 508; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(a) (Supp. 2003).
75. 415 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1987).
76. Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 507. In Fastow, the court reversed the order that granted sum-
mary judgment to the Water District and partially dismissed Michael Fastow's personal injury ac-
tion against the Park District. Id. at 510. The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the action
for further proceedings. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.; See generally N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 53-08 (1999).
79. See, e.g., Hovet v. City of Bagley, 325 N.W.2d 813, 815-16 (Minn. 1982) (denying the
City's motion to dismiss a personal injury action that occurred at a beach owned and operated by
the City because the Legislature had not explicitly made provisions for protection of munici-
palities when it reenacted the statute after it had abrogated sovereign immunity for political subdi-
visions); Ferres v. City of New Rochelle, 502 N.E.2d 972, 976-78 (N.Y. 1986) (affirming the trial
and appellate court's decisions awarding compensation for personal injury to plaintiff who was
injured while riding his bicycle across the entrance of a municipal park); Borgen v. Ford Pitt
Museum Assoc. Inc., 477 A.2d 36, 38-39 (Pa. Commw. 1984) (holding that the Commonwealth
was not meant to be included in the phrase "owner of land," and it was liable to persons claiming
injuries as a result of an explosion of a ceremonial cannon fired at a state park).
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argument and granted immunity to political subdivisions despite case law to
the contrary.8 0 When the recreational use immunity chapter was enacted in
1965, it did not expressly grant political subdivisions governmental im-
munity from civil actions, 81 yet the language of the statute did not expressly
exclude political subdivisions from the security it allowed private
landowners.8 2
The "[w]illful or malicious" language of the North Dakota statutes is
vital in any analysis, and willful misconduct is often a question for the
jury.8 3 Willful or malicious injury necessitates "knowledge of a situation
requiring the exercise of ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to
another [and] the ability to avoid resulting harm by ordinary care and dili-
gence."8 4 It further requires the omission of care and diligence to avoid
"danger when to an ordinary person it must be apparent that the result likely
would prove disastrous to another."85
2. Interpreting the "Willful or Malicious" Language
of Section 53-08-05(1)
In 1985, the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the recreational use immunity chapter in Stokka v. Cass County Electric
Co-op., Inc.,86 as it applied to a private landowner. 87 In Stokka, a snow-
mobiler died after hitting an unmarked guy wire placed by the defendant's
electric company on its easement on the side of a country road. 88 The
decedent's widow brought an action for damages that resulted from his
death. 89 The court found that the electric company had actual knowledge
that the guy wire was dangerous for snowmobilers because the wire was
placed in the middle of a well-known and used snowmobile path. 90 The
presence of the wire was a threat to the safety and well-being of snow-
mobilers who used the trail. 9' Stokka forced the North Dakota Supreme
80. Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 507-08.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Stokka v. Cass County Elec. Coop., 373 N.W.2d 911, 915-16 (N.D. 1985) (emphasis
added).
84. Van Ornum v. Otter Tail Power Co., 210 N.W.2d 188, 202 (N.D. 1973).
85. Id.
86. 373 N.W.2d 911 (N.D. 1985).
87. Stokka, 373 N.W.2d at 912. The defendant had an easement that allowed the electric
company to place the wire on the road. Id. at 911.
88. Id. at 912.
89. Id. at 911.
90. Id. at 916.
91. Id.
2003]
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Court to interpret the "willful or malicious" language of the recreational
use immunity statutes. 92
The court determined that section 53-08-05 was applicable and that the
appropriate elements must be shown in order to demonstrate "willful or
malicious intent" to cause harm or inflict injury upon another. 93 The North
Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court that there was no
admissible evidence upon which a jury could base an inference of willful or
malicious conduct.94 The court held that whether or not a failure to guard
or warn was willful was a question of fact for a jury.95 The court cited the
willful or wanton language from Van Orum v. Otter Tail Power Company.96
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that there was information
accessible to the trial court that the electric company was aware that such an
unmarked guy wire was a risk to snowmobilers because it installed guy
wires to the easement property in question after the fatal accident of Mr.
Stokka.97 The court also determined that a jury could have possibly con-
cluded that the electric company "willfully failed to guard or warn against
the dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity." 98 Liability does exist if
a party willfully or maliciously failed "to guard or warn against a dangerous
condition, use, structure, or activity." 99 The electric company had knowl-
edge that the property was a high traffic snowmobile area.100 In his
opinion, Justice Erickstad determined that since genuine issues of material
92. Id. at 913. Section 53-08-03 of the North Dakota Century Code, not invitee or license of
landowner states:
Subject to the provisions of section 53-08-05, an owner of land, who either directly or
indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use such property for
recreational purposes does not thereby:
1. Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose;
2. Confer upon such persons the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a
duty of care is owed; or
3. Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any inquiry to person or
property caused by an act or omission of such persons.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-03 (1999).
93. Stokka v. Cass County Elec. Coop., 373 N.W.2d 911, 912-13 (N.D. 1985) (citing Van
Omum v. Otter Tail Power Co., 210 N.W.2d 188, 202 (N.D. 1973) (establishing the standard for
willful conduct)).
94. Id. at 915.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Van Orum, 210 N.W.2d at 202). Van Orum established willful or wanton
infliction to require 1) "actual knowledge of circumstances that required exercise of ordinary
care... to prevent injury, 2) ability to avoid harm by ordinary care, and 3) the error of such care
... to prevent danger when it is clear to an ordinary person that the result may be disastrous to
another." Van Orum, 210 N.W.2d at 202.
97. Stokka, 373 N.W.2d at 916.
98. Id.
99. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-05(1) (1999).
100. Stokka, 373 N.W.2d at 916.
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fact were present, summary judgment was improper and the case was
remanded back for trial. 101
In a special concurrence, Justice VandeWalle stated that the court must
assume the Legislature intended something more than ordinary negligence
when it examined the willful or malicious language of section 53-08-05 as
an exception to section 53-08-02.102 Justice VandeWalle found the court's
interpretation of Van Orum to be more forgiving.103 He cited other cases'
interpretation of willful and wanton conduct as "something more than negli-
gence," and it "demonstrates an affirmative, reckless state of mind or
deliberate recklessness on the part of the defendant." 104 Since the court pre-
sumed the Legislature to know the less severe definition of willful adopted
in Van Orum, Justice Vandewalle agreed that summary judgment was
improper. 105
Other states have defeated recreational use immunity when the injured
party can show that the defendant knew that a dangerous condition existed.
In Payne v. City of Bellevue, 0 6 the plaintiffs were a husband and wife who
brought a personal injury action against the city when the husband was
injured when his bicycle hit a hole at the edge of a public trail owned and
maintained by the city, much like Olson.10 7 The Paynes argued that the
City knew that a dangerous condition existed on its land.108 The City of
Bellevue did not post a sign to warn recreational land users of the danger. 109
To defeat the immunity granted in Washington by the state's recrea-
tional use immunity statutes, the injured plaintiff must "show each element
in the 'known dangerous artificial latent condition' exception where warn-
ing signs have not been conspicuously posted."1lO The Washington Court
of Appeals reversed the summary judgment granted to the defense and
remanded the case for trial.I1 The court found a question of fact existed as
101. Id. at 917.
102. Id. (VandeWall, J., concurring). Section 53-05-02 affords a landowner no duty of care
to keep property safe from use by others for recreational purposes. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-05-02
(1965).
103. Stokka, 373 N.W.2d at 916 (citing Van Orum v. Otter Tail Power Co., 210 N.W.2d 188
(N.D. 1973)).
104. Id. at 917 (citing Tranby v. Brodock, 348 N.W.2d 458, 461 (S.D. 1984)).
105. Id.
106. No. 38959-9-1, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1401 (Wash. Ct. App., Div. 1 Aug. 25, 1997).
107. Payne, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1401 at *2; see also Olson v. Bismarck Park &
Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, T 16, 642 N.W.2d 864, 870.
108. Payne, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1401 at *2, *5, *7.
109. Id. at *7.
110. Id. at **9- 10 (citing Gaeta v. Seattle City Light, 774 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Wash. App.
1989)).
111. Id. at *12.
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to whether or not the City knew of a dangerous, artificial, and latent
condition on its land and did not conspicuously post a notice. 112
3. The District Court for Slope County, Southwest Judicial
District, Abrogated Sovereign Immunity from the State
of North Dakota
In Bulman v. Hulstrand Construction,113 the North Dakota Supreme
Court abolished the concept of sovereign immunity.1 4 The court deter-
mined that injustice was perpetuated by not allowing recovery for tortious
conduct simply because of the offender's status. 1 5
The court further reasoned that sovereign immunity "contradicts the
essence of tort law that liability follows negligence."1 6 Following the
court's decision in Bulman, the Legislature again amended the recreational
use immunity statutes. 117
The Legislature made another attempt to shield political subdivisions
from recreational use liability and amended the statutory language in
1995.118 The Legislature determined an emergency existed and passed the
Act to protect public landowners.119 The Legislature also clarified the
definition of recreational purposes after the outcome of Bulman. 120
4. The Legislature Further Amends Statutory Language of
Section 53-08-01
In 1995, Senate Bill 2127, sponsored by the Agriculture Committee at
the request of the Board of University and School Lands, once again
revisited the issue of sovereign immunity.121 Section 7 of the Bill was de-
clared as an emergency measure and passed unanimously. 122 In the text of
the bill, the Legislature changed the definition of land in the section 53-08-
112. Id. In Olson, signs were conspicuously posted on Tom 0' Leary Hill that cautioned
people to use care. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 1 3, 642 N.W.2d
864, 866.
113. 521 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1994).
114. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 633.
115. Id. at 638.
116. Id.
117. 1993 N.D. Laws 503, § 1.
118. S.B. 2127, 54th Leg. (N.D. 1995).
119. Id; Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 5 8, 642 N.W.2d 864,
867.
120. Olson, 8, 642 N.W.2d at 867.
121. S.B. 2127, 54th Leg. (N.D. 1995).
122. Id.
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01 to include "all public and private land" and amended the definition of
recreational purposes to its current form.123
Further, the Legislature omitted specific recreational purposes from the
language of the code, making it broader in scope.124 The Legislature also
added the language "any activity engaged in for the purpose of exercise,
relaxation, pleasure, or education" to the definition of recreational pur-
pose.125 The purpose of the amendment was to clarify that the statutes al-
lowed for "a limitation of liability for all landowners, regardless of whether
they were private or public."126 The Legislature made it clear that public
lands, not simply private lands, were included in the statute. 127 Addition-
ally, the House Agricultural Committee heard testimony that state agencies
could rely on section 53-08-01 to protect them from liability when the gen-
eral public made use of state lands for recreation without charging a fee.128
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court had previously addressed
the issue of recreational use immunity in Fastow, it was presented with a
question of recreational use immunity again in Hovland v. City of Grand
Forks.129 The City claimed it was immune from tort liability based on
North Dakota's recreational use immunity statutes.1 30
123. ld; see also Olson, 5J 6, 8, 642 N.W.2d at 867. Section 53-08-01 states:
In this chapter, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:
1. Charge means the amount of money asked in return for an invitation to enter
or go upon the land.
2. Land includes all public and private land, roads, water, watercourses, and
ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment thereon.
3. Owner includes tenant, lessee, occupant, or person in control of the premises.
4. Recreational purposes include any activity engaged in for the purpose of
exercise, relaxation, pleasure, or education.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-01 (1999).
124. Brief for Appellee at 7, Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 642
N.W.2d 864 (No. 20010249).
125. 1995 N.D. Laws 162, § 7.
126. 1995 Senate Standing Committee Minutes, Hearing on S.B. 2127 Before the Senate
Agricultural Comm., 1995 Leg., 54th Sess. Appendix IV (N.D. 1995) (statement of Robert
Olheiser, State Land Commissioner) [Hereinafter Olheiser statement].
127. Id. The amendments to chapter 53-08 became effective on March 20, 1995. 1995 N.D.
Laws 162.
128. 1995 House Agricultural Committee Minutes, Hearing on S.B. 2127 Before the House
Agricultural Comm., 1995 Leg., 54th Sess. 2 (N.D. 1995) (statement of Linda Kahl, Surface
Leasing Coordinator).
129. 1997 ND 95, 563 N.W.2d 384; see generally Fastow v. Burleigh County Water Res.
Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505 (N.D.
1987).
130. Hovland, 5 4, 563 N.W.2d at 386.
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5. The North Dakota Supreme Court's Analysis
of the Recreational Use Immunity Statute in Hovland
v. City of Grand Forks
In Hovland, the court invalidated its prior decision and analysis of the
recreational use immunity chapter in Fastow.131 It determined that the pre-
1995 versions of the recreational use immunity statutes did not pertain to
political subdivisions. 132
In Hovland, Caroline Hovland sustained injuries, including a broken
wrist, while in-line skating on a Grand Forks city bike path.133 The Hov-
lands argued that the City of Grand Forks (City) failed to inspect and main-
tain the bike path that caused Caroline's injuries. 34 The City moved for
summary judgment under the contention that it was immune from suit under
North Dakota's recreational use immunity statutes. 135 The City based its
argument on Fastow, where the court found that the state's recreational use
immunity statutes applied to political subdivisions.136
The Hovlands argued that chapter 53-08 did not shield the City from
liability for injuries sustained on city land.137 In their argument, the Hov-
lands relied upon the Model Act drafted by the Council of State Govern-
ments as "Suggested State Legislation."' 38 The Model Act was "designed
to encourage availability of private lands by limiting the liability of
owners."' 139 The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with the Hovlands
and determined that political subdivisions were different from private land-
6wners and therefore could be held liable in recreational use lawsuits.140
131. Id. 5 16, 563 N.W.2d at 388. In Hovland, the City argued that Fastow should apply
because political subdivisions are only liable when private landowners are liable under section 32-
12.1-03(1) of the North Dakota Century Code, and that political subdivisions are not liable in
recreational use lawsuits because private landowners are not liable. Id. The court did not agree.
Id. 7, 563 N.W.2d at 386. Fastow held that the recreational use immunity statutes applied to
political subdivisions as well as private land. Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 507.
132. Hovland, T 16, 563 N.W.2d at 388.
133. Id. 1, 563 N.W.2d at 385.
134. Id. 3.
135. Id. 4 4, 562 N.W.2d at 386 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 53-08 (1999)).
136. Id. 7 (citing Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 508).
137. Hovland, 4, 563 N.W.2d at 386.
138. Id. 5 9, 563 N.W.2d at 387. The Model Act drafted by the Council of State Govern-
ments as "Suggested State Legislation" is very similar to North Dakota's recreational use immuni-
ty statutes. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 42, at 1. Interestingly, the 1965
Model Act did not include governmental entities in the definition of owner. Joan M. O'Brien, The
Connecticut Recreational Use Statute: Should a Municipality Be Immune From Tort Liability?,
15 PACE L. REV. 963,990 (1995).
139. Hovland, T 9, 563 N.W.2d at 387 (citing COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra
note 42, at 1).
140. Id. T 7, 563 N.W.2d at 386.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that if it adopted the City's
version of the statute, political subdivisions would be protected for virtually
every recreational purpose outlined in North Dakota Century Code section
58-03-01(4).141 Had the court found in favor of the City, political sub-
divisions would have been granted immunity after a person suffered injuries
while using public roads or public property for their own purposes.142 The
court reasoned that such an interpretation would be so broad that every
public landowner would be immune from any form of liability for any in-
jury or accident that took place on its property. 143 To that end, public lands
were not granted immunity, but public organizations were granted im-
munity.144 If public lands were granted such immunity, Caroline Hovland
could not receive compensation for her injuries if she had used the bike path
for recreational use, but if she had used the bike path for a nonrecreational
use, she would have been allowed to hold the landowner(s) liable. 145
A facially neutral statute may infringe upon equal protection in its
application or effect.146 When a statute is enacted, it carries a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality unless the challenging party demonstrates
"that it contravenes the state or federal constitution." 147 The court in Hov-
land was required to determine whether there was a "close correspondence
between the statutory classification and the legislative" goal of the recie-
ational use immunity statutes.148 In its review of the applicable standard,
the North Dakota Supreme Court examined the context of public access to
public lands and the disparate treatment of those public land users. 149 The
court determined that an intermediate standard of review was appropriaie
because the City's analysis of the recreational use immunity statutes
restricted recovery for personal injury.150 In particular, the North Dakota
Supreme Court analyzed the statute under an intermediate standard of
141. Id. 5 11,563 N.W.2d at 387.
142. ld; N.D. CENT. CODE § 58-03-01(4) (2000).
143. Hovland, $ 11, 563 N.W.2d at 387.
144. Id. 5 13, 563 N.W.2d at 388.
145. Id.
146. State v. Wilt, 371 N.W.2d 159, 160 (N.D. 1985); see also State v. Mathisen, 365
N.W.2d 129, 133 (N.D. 1984).
147. In re M.D., 1999 ND 160, 5 25, 598 N.W.2d 799, 804.
148. Hovland, 5 16, 563 N.W.2d at 388.
149. Id. 113, 563 N.W.2d at 388.
150. Id. 16. When a statute is challenged on equal protection grounds and an important
substantive right is involved, the court applies an intermediate standard of review, requiring a
close correspondence between the statutory classification and the legislative goal. Gange v. Clerk
of Burleigh County Dist. Court, 429 N.W.2d 429, 433 (N.D. 1988). "The right to recover for
personal injuries is an important substantive right." Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co. of LaMoure,
2000 ND 111, T 5, 611 N.W.2d 168, 170; Bouchard v. Johnson, 555 N.W.2d 81, 87 (N.D. 1996);
Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 325 (N.D. 1986).
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review, specifically whether there was a "close correspondence between
statutory classification and legislative goals."' 5' The court reasoned that the
legislative history did not divulge any basis for the contention that a recre-
ational user of public land could not recover for personal injuries while a
nonrecreational user could. 152 The court ultimately decided that the City of
Grand Forks was not immune under North Dakota's recreational use
immunity statutes.153
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice VandeWalle disagreed with the
Hovlands' argument.154 He believed the majority ignored the court's prior
position that political subdivisions that operated recreational areas were im-
mune under chapter 53-08 of the North Dakota Century Code.155 He con-
cluded that although the legislature had made other changes to chapter 53-
08 that appeared to strengthen immunity, it had not amended chapter 53-08
to counteract the decision in Fastow.156 Chief Justice VandeWalle believed
that bike paths should be included in chapter 53-08's definition of land. 57
He further described the language of section 32-12.1-03(1) and stated that
the Legislature did not dispute this language but instead reinforced it.158
North Dakota is not the only state that grants immunity to political
subdivisions from tort liability.159 Other states have variations of adopted
recreation use immunity statutes. 160 In a strikingly similar case to the Olson
decision, a Pennsylvania court awarded summary judgment to the defendant
after analyzing Pennsylvania's recreational use immunity statutes.161
151. Hovland, 16, 563 N.W.2d at 388.
152. Id.
153. Id. 17, 563 N.W.2d at 389.
154. Hovland, 5 26, 563 N.W.2d at 390 (VandeWalle, C. J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id. 1 23, 563 N.W.2d at 389.
157. Id. TJ 28-29, 563 N.W.2d at 390-9 1.
158. Id. T 30, 563 N.W.2d at 391. Section 32-12.1-03(1) states:
Each political subdivision is liable for money damages for injuries when the injuries
are proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any
employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment or office under
circumstances where the employee would be personally liable to a claimant in
accordance with the laws of this state, or injury caused from some condition or use of
tangible property, real or personal, under circumstances where the political
subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(1) (Supp. 2003).
159. Miller, supra note 37, at § 2a.
160. Id.




C. TORT IMMUNITY AND RECREATIONAL USE STATUTES OUTSIDE OF
NORTH DAKOTA
In Blake v. United States,162 plaintiff Courtney Blake was tobogganing
in Valley Forge National Historical Park when her toboggan hit a mound of
snow that had built up around an old telephone box.163 Blake suffered
injuries when the toboggan hit the ground and she continued towards the
bottom of the hill.164 The Government sought summary judgment based on
the Recreation Use of Land and Water Act (RUA).165 Plaintiff Blake
argued that the Government was not immune from suit because its conduct
demonstrated a "willful and malicious failure to guard or warn against a
dangerous condition."166 The Pennsylvania RUA was similar to the statutes
in North Dakota; it intended to encourage landowners to open their land to
the public for recreational purposes and limit landowner liability.167
In Blake, the court analyzed whether the National Park fit the definition
of land as the Act intended and whether the presence of a junction box
constituted a dangerous condition that the defendant had actual knowl-
edge. 168 The court concluded that RUA tort immunity extended to the
National Park because the sledding and tobogganing hill had received no
improvements.169 Additionally, the Park was not an enclosed recreational
facility, which would constitute an improvement. 70 Instead, the National
Historical Park was exactly the type of land intended for RUA tort
immunity, and the defendant was properly awarded summary judgment.171
Blake further argued that the Government "willfully or maliciously
failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or
activity, and should therefore be denied RUA tort immunity." 172 Blake
162. No. CIV.A.97-0807, 1998 WL 111802 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 1998).
163. Blake, 1998 WL 111802, at *9.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also 68 PA. CONS. STAT. § 477-1 (1994). The RUA provides "broad immunity
from tort liability for land owners who permit their land to be used by the public without charge
and for limited recreational purposes." 68 PA. CONS. STAT. § 477-1.
166. Blake, 1998 WL 111802, at *1; 68 PA. CONS. STAT. § 477-6(1).
167. 68 PA. CONS. STAT. § 477-1 (1994). "[Tjhe purpose of this act is to encourage owners
of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting
their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes." Id. Section 477-3 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitutional Statute further attempts to establish private landowner immunity by stating
that "an owner of land owes no duty of care to keep their land safe for use by others for
recreational purposes, or to give warning of a dangerous condition,.., or activity on their land to
people entering for recreational purposes." PA. CONS. STAT. § 477-3 (1994).
168. Blake, 1998 WL 111802, at *8.
169. Id. at *6.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *9.
172. Id. at *8.
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based her conclusion on the following: 1) the defendant knew of the junc-
tion box that caused her injuries, 2) the hill was used by the public for
purposes of sledding and tobogganing, 3) the defendant knew of other ac-
cidents that occurred on the hill, and 4) the defendant observed the activity
on the hill prior to the plaintiff's accident.173 Blake argued that the tort
immunity created by the RUA is not absolute and cited section 477-6 of the
statute. 174
The court granted summary judgment to the defendant because Valley
Forge was unimproved property to which the RUA was meant to apply, and
the presence of the junction box did not constitute a.dangerous condition of
which the defendant had actual knowledge. 175 RUA tort immunity has been
granted to national parks, undeveloped portions of municipal public parks,
and somewhat developed parks, as long as any structures are intended to
promote a recreational purpose anticipated by the RUA,176
In Payne v. City of Bellevue, 177 Stan Payne sustained severe injuries
when his bicycle hit a hole at the edge of a public trail.178 The lower court
granted immunity to the city under Washington's recreational use immunity
statutes. 179 In Payne, the court analyzed whether the recreational use im-
munity statute applied to the City.180 The court held that the recreational
use immunity statute clearly applied to public landowners whose land was
mainly used for recreation. 181 The court also determined that although the
Act's original intent was to encourage private landowners to open their land
to the general public, it had now changed to cover private and public
landowners and explicitly included immunity for those public entities.182
Similarly, based on the language of North Dakota's recreational use
immunity statutes, political subdivisions in North Dakota were protected by
173. Id.
174. Id. Section 477-6 states, "Nothing in this act limits in any way any liability which
otherwise exists (1) For willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous
condition, use, structure, or activity." 68 PA. CONST. STAT. § 477-1 (1994).
175. Blake, 1998 WL 111802, at *9. The court concluded that the junction box did not
represent a dangerous situation that the Government was aware of. Id.
176. Id. at *6.
177. No. 38959-9-1, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1401, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App., Div. 1, Aug. 25,
1997).
178. Payne, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1401, at *1.
179. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.200-.210 (2002)).
180. Id. at *6.
181. Id.
182. Id. Sections 4.24.00 and 4.24.210 of the Washington Revenue Code encourage owners
"of land ... to make them available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their
liability toward persons entering thereon." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.200 (2002).
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the 1995 legislative amendments. 183 In Olson v. Bismarck Parks and Recre-
ation District,184 the court was confronted with a challenge to the con-
stitutionality of the statutes following their amendment and as applied to a
public landowner. 185
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Kapsner wrote the majority opinion of the court, which Chief
Justice VandeWalle, Justice Sandstrom, and Justice Neumann joined.186
Justice Neumann also filed a concurring opinion regarding the language and
policy arguments despite the dicta he authored in Hovland.187 Justices
Maring and Sandstrom also joined Judge Neumann's concurring opinion.188
Justice Maring specially concurred because she disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that the primary purpose of the recreational use im-
munity statutes had not changed since their original enactment in 1965.189
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision
in Olson-that the BPRD's recreational use immunity did not violate the
equal protection provision of the North Dakota Constitution.190 The court
evaluated the recreational use immunity statutes of North Dakota and the
changes that the statutes have underwent since their original enactment. 191
In the majority opinion, the North Dakota Supreme Court also dis-
cussed the main argument of Olson and Howard and their reliance upon
statements made by the court in Hovland.192 The court determined that the
statements it made in Hovland, that Olson and Howard relied upon, were
dicta.193 The court was not compelled by stare decisis to follow the dicta
statements in Hovland. 94 The court also analyzed the recreational use
immunity statutes of North Dakota and the legislative goals that formed




186. Id. at 871.
187. Id. 20, 642 N.W.2d at 871-72 (Neumann, J., concurring).
188. Id. 24, 642 N.W.2d at 872.
189. Id. 5 25-26.
190. Id. T5 13-18, 642 N.W.2d at 869-71. Article I of the North Dakota Constitution states,
"No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked or
repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted privileges
or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." N.D. CONST. art. I,
§21.
191. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 55 13-14, 642 N.W.2d 864,
870-71.
192. Id., 13, 642 N.W.2d at 869.
193. Id. 13, 642 N.W.2d at 869-70.
194. Id.
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those statutes.195 It found that a close correspondence existed between the
statutory classification and the legislative goals.196
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that Olson and Howard
did not argue that the BPRD's actions in the case were "[wiillful and ma-
licious" as required under section 53-08-05(1) of the North Dakota Century
Code and therefore affirmed the summary judgment of the lower court in
favor of the BPRD. 197
1. The Application of Section 53-08-03
The BPRD argued that Olson and Howard were barred from bringing
the claim because of the language of chapter 53-08.198 Tom O'Leary Hill is
public land used by the public for recreational purposes at no fee.199 The
language of the recreational use chapter offers immunity to landowners for
purposes of recreation for failure to warn or keep the premises safe from
hazardous conditions unless the landowner's conduct was willful and mali-
cious. 200 Olson and Howard made no such claim against the BPRD.201
Olson and Howard questioned the constitutionality of the recreational
use immunity statutes. 202 They argued that there was an equal protection
disparity and that the distinction between a nonrecreational user of public
land and a recreational user was not justified.203
2. Analysis of Olson and Howard's Constitutionality Argument
Olson and Howard challenged the constitutionality of the recreational
use immunity chapter based on the court's prior decision in Hovland.204
Olson and Howard argued that prior to Hovland, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that article I, section 21 of the North Dakota Constitution, along
with the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, raised the right
195. Id. T 14, 642 N.W.2d at 870.
196. Id. T 13, 642 N.W.2d at 869-70.
197. Id. T 18, 642 N.W.2d at 871.
198. Id. T 3,642 N.W.2d at 866.
199. Id. 5 2, 642 N.W.2d at 865-66.
200. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-01 to -05 (1999).
201. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 1 18,642 N.W.2d 864,
871,
202. Id. T 9, 642 N.W.2d at 868.
203. Id.
204. Id. T 13, 642 N.W.2d at 869; see also Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, T
12-13, 563 N.W.2d 384, 388. In general, the court presumes that enacted statutes are constitu-
tional and require strong arguments to overrule the Legislature. Olson, 11, 642 N.W.2d at 868.
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to be compensated for injuries as an important substantive right. 205 The
North Dakota Supreme Court applied an intermediate standard of review. 206
An intermediate standard of review requires a close correspondence
between the statutory classification and the legislative goal.207
A statute that appears neutral on its face may violate equal protection in
the application or effect of the statute.208 The court reiterated that a party
can only challenge the constitutionality of a statute if it is applicable to that
party.209 In the past, the court determined that when an equal protection
challenge was addressed, "a person to whom a statute constitutionally may
be applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it might con-
ceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others."2 10 When a party chal-
lenges a statute on equal protection grounds and an important substantive
right is involved, the court must apply an intermediate level of review. 21'
As a result, the court inquired as to whether there was a close correspon-
dence between the statutory classification and the legislative goal.212
Olson and Howard argued that the recreational use immunity statutes
were not logical because they provided a private landowner with limited
liability in exchange for making the land available for the public's use,
without charge, for a recreational purpose.213 They argued that such logic
did not have the same justification when applied to public landowners
because public land is already open to the community. 214
205. Id. 5 9 (citing Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 325 (N.D. 1986)). Article
I, section 21 of the North Dakota Constitution provides the following: "No special privileges or
immunities shall be granted which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislative
assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities which upon
the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 21.
206. Olson, 9, 642 N.W.2d at 868.
207. Id. 5 11 (citing Gange v. Clerk of Burleigh County Dist. Court, 429 N.W.2d 429, 433
(N.D. 1988))..
208. Id. T 10 (citing State v. Wilt, 371 N.W.2d 159, 160 (N.D. 1985)).
209. Id. (citing State v. Dvorak, 2002 ND 6, 5 28, 604 N.W.2d 445, 453).
210. Id. (citing First Bank of Buffalo v. Conrad, 350 N.W.2d 580, 584 (N.D. 1984)).
211. Id. 5 11 (citing Gange, 429 N.W.2d at 433 (N.D. 1988)).
212. Id.
213. Id. T 15, 642 N.W.2d at 870.
214. Id. Several courts have rejected this type of distinction. Id. (citing Jones v. United
States, 639 F.2d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1982); Otteson v. United States, 622 F.2d 516, 519 (10thCir.
1980); Gard v. United States, 594 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1979)); McCarver v. Manson Park &
Recreation Dist., 597 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Wash. 1979). In Gard v. United States, 549 F.2d 1230
(9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit determined that the principle of encouraging landowners to open
their land to the public, by limiting their potential tort liability, applies equally to the Government
and other landowners. Gard, 594, F.2d at 1233. Gard argued the purpose of the statute was "to
encourage landowners to open up their land to recreational use and that such rationale does not
apply to the Government." Id. The court disagreed and determined the "principle of encouraging
landowners to open their land by limiting potential tort liability applies with equal force to the
Government as to other landowners." Id.
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Olson and Howard pointed out that the court in Hovland analyzed the
pre-1995 language of the North Dakota Century Code when it deemed the
statute unconstitutional. 215 Olson. and Howard cited the court regarding the
unconstitutionality in Hovland, which stated:
If public lands were granted immunity for all recreational activities,
Caroline could not recover for her injuries because she was using the bike
path for a recreational use, but had she been using the bike path for a non-
recreational use she would be allowed to recover. This interpretation allows
the government to treat two classes of persons injured on public lands
differently: it forbids recovery for personal injuries incurred during recre-
ational activities, but permits recovery for personal injuries incurred during
non-recreational activities. The recreational use immunity statute was
created to encourage private landowners to permit public access to private
lands. In the context of public access to private lands, the disparate treat-
ment of recreational uses seems to make sense. In the context of public ac-
cess to public lands, the disparate treatment is much harder to understand.216
Olson and Howard pointed out that in Hovland, the court also followed
an intermediate level of review, most often applied when an "important
substantive right" is concerned. 217 Like Olson, the court analyzed whether
there was a "close correspondence between statutory classification and
legislative goals." 218 Olson and Howard argued that in Hovland, the court
found that the legislative history did not disclose any specific reason why a
recreational user of public land could not recover for personal injuries
sustained when a nonrecreational user could.2 19 Olson and Howard felt that
the court should fail to discover any close correspondence between the
legislative goals and the statute and determine that the statute fails an equal
protection challenge. 220
Olson and Howard argued that a person could not recover for injuries
suffered by using public land for a recreational use, but could recover if he
or she were using public land for nonrecreational purposes. 221 The North
Dakota Supreme Court was not swayed by this separate classification
argument and granted the BPRD's summary judgment motion.222
215. Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61,
642 N.W.2d 864 (No. 20010249).
216. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 5J 13, 642 N.W.2d 864, 869
(quoting Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95,5 13, 563 N.W.2d 384, 388).




221. Olson v. Bismarck Parks and Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, J 8,642 N.W.2d 864, 867.
222. Id. 14, 642 N.W.2d at 870.
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3. Application of the Hovland Case Following the 1995
Amendments by the Legislature to Chapter 53-08 to Olson
The BPRD argued that although the Hovlands' argument was accurate
at that time, such an argument was now irrelevant because the statute was
amended by the Legislature in 1995.223 The court agreed and determined
that any reliance on statements made in Hovland was irrelevant because
those statements were dicta.224 The court was not compelled by stare
decisis to follow the dicta in Hovland.225 In Hovland, the North Dakota
Supreme Court applied Chapter 53-08 as it existed in 1993 and not the
amended version of section 53-08-01(2).226
Olson and Howard suffered their injuries on November 26, 2000.227
Thus, the court applied the 1995 amended statute to the matter against the
BPRD and stated that Hovland was no longer applicable law.228 The
change to the statute amended the definition of the recreational use im-
munity from simply "land" to include "all public and private land." 229 The
distinction amended the definition of recreational purposes to its current
form today.230 Such a legislative change to the recreational use immunity
statutes limited the liability of public lands and left Olson and Howard
without recourse against the BPRD.231
Olson and Howard argued that the logic of the statute was not per-
suasive when the general population was allowed to use public lands and
that no legislative goals were outlined in the history. 232 They further argued
that a review of chapter 53-08 revealed no association between the statutory
classification and the legislative goals.233 The court concluded that there
was a close correspondence between the statutory classification and the
legislative goals because the "primary purpose of [the statute] had not
changed since its original enactment." 234 North Dakota's Legislature en-
acted the recreational use immunity statutes and intended to provide limited
223. Brief for Appellee at 11, Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 642
N.W.2d 864 (No. 20010249).
224. Olson, 5 13, 642 N.W.2d at 869.
225. Id.
226. Olson, 5 8, 642 N.W.2d at 867-68.
227. Id. 5 2, 642 N.W.2d at 865.
228. Id. 55 8, 13, 642 N.W.2d at 867-68, 869-70.
229. 1995 N.D. Laws 162, § 7.
230. Olson, 5 8, 642 N.W.2d at 867.
231. Id. T 17, 642 N.W.2d at 871.
232. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61,
642 N.W.2d 864 (No. 20010249).
233. Id. at 7.
234. Olson, 5 13-14, 642 N.W.2d at 869-70 (emphasis added).
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tort liability to landowners and encourage them to allow the public access to
their land without charge.235
Olson and Howard attempted to show an equal protection disparity
similar to Hovland,236 a disparity between a nonrecreational user of land
and a recreational user that was unjustified.37 Olson argued that the way
the statute is written today, if a person walked on the path to and from work
the city would not be immune from tort liability.2 38 However, a person
using the path to ride a bike for exercise or enjoyment meets the established
recreational use standard, and a political subdivision like the BPRD would
be granted immunity. 239 Olson and Howard argued that other courts had
determined that "recreational use immunity statutes apply equally to every-
one who enters a recreational area." 240 The court reasoned that "the recre-
ational use immunity statutes create two classes of people and treat them
differently." 241 The two classes created were "nonpaying recreational users
of another person's land and all other people using the land of another."242
The court found that the difference between the classes was based on the
location and nature of the injured person's conduct when the injury takes
place, which made the statute constitutional as it was written.243
4. The Public Policy Argument of Olson and Howard
Olson and Howard argued that the logic of cases that the BPRD cited,
such as Riksem v. City of Seattle244 and Sublett v. United States,245 were
against public policy, and North Dakota should not adopt such reasoning.246
The court disagreed, noting that "courts have uniformly rejected a variety of
235. Id. 5 14, 642 N.W.2d at 870.
236. Brief for Appellant at 8, Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 642
N.W.2d 864 (No. 20010249). In Hovland, the court concluded that the pre-1995 legislative his-
tory of section 53-08-02 was not intended to shield political subdivisions from recreation liability.
Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, 5 11, 563 N.W.2d 384, 387-88. The court stated
that "applying the recreational use statute to the political subdivision liability statute completely
circumvents the Legislature's intent under North Dakota Century Code section 32-12.1-03 and
leads to an unintended and absurd result." Id.
237. Brief for Appellant at 8-9, Olson (No. 20010249).
238. Id. at 9.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citing Riksem v. City of Seattle, 736 P.2d 275, 278 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)).
241. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 14, 642 N.W.2d 864,
870.
242. Id.
243. Id. (citing Harlan v. Frazier, 635 F. Supp. 718, 724 (W.D. La. 1986)).
244. 736 P.2d 275 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
245. 688 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1985).
246. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 5 12,642 N.W.2d 864, 868.
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constitutional attacks against such legislation." 247 Olson and Howard con-
cluded that no close correspondence existed between the Legislature's
intent and the actual statute; therefore, the statute was unconstitutional and
should be struck down. 248 Furthermore, the courts in Riskum and Sublett
applied only a rational basis standard of review. 249 However, the North
Dakota Supreme Court believed that under any standard of review,
recreational use immunity overall was judicially accepted.250
5. Hovland and Intent of North Dakota Century Code Chapter
53-08
The court noted the legislative history and current language of the
recreational use immunity statutes in chapter 53-08.251 The BPRD pointed
out the only foundation for Olson and Howard's constitutional challenge to
recreational use immunity was Hovland.252
The court noted the findings in Hovland, regarding the constitutional
implications of applying recreational use immunity to political subdivisions,
were only dicta and therefore were afforded no weight.2 53 In response to
Olson and Howards' assertion that the legislative history did not show a
close correspondence between the statutory classification and legislative
goals, the BPRD pointed out that the Legislature inflated and intensified the
immunity clause in chapter 53-08.254
The court in Olson found that chapter 53-08 was clear and the recre-
ational use immunity statutes did not violate the North Dakota Consti-
tution.255 In order to achieve its goal, the Legislature made the decision that
recreational users of public land must give up their right to sue for personal
injuries caused by dangerous land conditions or the public landowner's
failure to warn against such conditions unless the landowner's conduct
constituted willful and malicious behavior.256 The North Dakota Supreme
Court concluded that the recreational use immunity statutes advanced the
247. Id.
248. Id. T 3, 642 N.W.2d at 865 (claiming that section 53-08 of the North Dakota Century
Code violated article 1, section 21 of the state's constitution).
249. Id. 5 12, 642 N.W.2d at 868-69.
250. Id.
251. Id. 5 5-6, 642 N.W.2d at 866-67.
252. Brief for Appellee at 10, Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61,
642 N.W.2d 864 (No. 20010249).
253. Olson, T 8, 642 N.W.2d at 867-68.
254. Appellee's Brief at 12, Olson (No. 20010249).
255. Olson, 8-17, 642 N.W.2d at 867-71; see also N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 21. The court
determined that the legislative intent was to encourage land to be made available to the public
without charge for recreational purposes. Olson, T 6, 642 N.W.2d at 867.
256. 1995 N.D. Laws 162.
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important legislative goal of opening private landowner's property to the
public for recreational use in a way that closely corresponds to the achieve-
ment of that goal.257 The BPRD argued that by limiting the liability of
public landowners through chapter 53-08, the Legislature recognized that
recreational activities, such as two adult women sledding down a hill, were
distinguishable from the activities of a person who is on the land for
nonrecreational purposes.258
The court determined that the recreational use immunity statutes were
constitutional and advanced an important legislative goal that closely cor-
responded to the achievement of that goal. 259 The court stated that situa-
tions may take place where the recreational use immunity statute would be
unconstitutional, but Olson and Howard did not present such a situation. 260
6. Sumnmary of Majority Opinion
In its decision of Olson, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that
Olson and Howard did not cite, nor had the court located, any case law to
strike down the recreational use immunity statutes due to unconstitu-
tionality. 261 The court noted that other jurisdictions had reviewed constitu-
tional challenges to their recreational use immunity statutes when applied to
public lands and governmental landowners and upheld public landowner
immunity. 262
B. JUSTICE NEUMANN'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Neumann, who authored the dicta in Hovland, joined the ma-
jority opinion in Olson.263 He stated that a close correlation existed
between the statutory classification in chapter 15-03 of the North Dakota
Century Code and the legislative goal of assisting the public in the use of
recreational land for sporting and free recreational opportunities. 264 Justice
Neumann declared Olson and Howard as clearly recreational users, who
257. Olson, 17, 642 N.W.2d at 871.
258. Appellee's Brief at 13, Olson (No. 20010249).
259. Olson, 17, 642 N.W.2d at 871.
260. Id. 16.
261. Id. 12, 642 N.W.2d at 868-69.
262. Id. (citing Mattice v. United States, Dep't of Interior, 969 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1992);
Simpson v United States, 652 F.2d 831, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1981); Harlan v. Frazier, 635 F. Supp.
718, 724 (W.D. La. 1986); Dickey v. City of Flagstaff, 4 P.3d 965, 967 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999);
Johnson v. Sunshine Mining Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 268, 271-73 (Idaho 1984); Moss v. Dep't of
Natural Res., 404 N.E. 2d 742, 745 (Ohio 1980); Johansen v. Reinermann, 352 N.W.2d 677, 679
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984); Riksem v. City of Seattle, 736 P.2d 275, 278-79 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)).
263. Id. T 20, 642 N.W.2d at 871 (Neumann, J., concurring) (citing Hovland v. City of Grand




used the park as a recreational area, for a recreational purpose, and paid no
fee to use the land involved. 265 Justice Neumann found a definite cor-
respondence between the classification and legislative goal of recreational
use.266 He noted that the Legislature determined the decision that North
Dakotans would be best served by "increasing free recreational opportuni-
ties, even if the safe use of those free opportunities would have to depend
primarily upon the caution and watchfulness of those who use them."267
Justice Neumann further commented on the unreserved language in the
Act, which covers recreational facilities and every publicly owned building,
road, and "ways" in North Dakota.268 . Justice Neumann analyzed the dis-
tinction between pedestrians walking to work because the weather was
pleasant and people walking to work because they were without transporta-
tion. 269 He admitted the close correspondence between such classifications
and that the legislative goal was not as clear.270
Justice Neumann analyzed his concern about the statute including the
word "education" in the definition of "recreational purposes." 271 He wrote
that the recreational use immunity statute reduced the duty of school dis-
tricts "to keep their buildings and premises safe for use by students who
have not paid a fee for the educational use of those premises." 272 Justice
Neumann also believed that at the same time, the recreational use immunity
statute holds the school districts to a higher standard of care for a student
who pays a fee to use those same areas for an extracurricular activity. 273 He
determined that the correspondence between the statutory classification and
legislative goal was hard to pin down.274 Justice Neumann concluded that
an analysis of whether to include educational language in the statute was
not necessary because those types of facts were not presented in Olson.275
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. J 21.
268. Id. 5 22.
269. Id. The distinction is one of recreation versus a nonrecreational purpose and using pub-
lic lands for business type purposes. Id. The language of the statute offers a duty to the person
using the land for the nonrecreational purpose, but no such duty is owed to the recreational user.
Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 53-08 (1999).
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C. JUSTICE MARING'S SPECIAL CONCURRENCE
Justice Maring concurred with the court's overall decision in Olson,
but disagreed with the majority's conclusion that no change in the primary
purpose had occurred to the recreational use immunity statutes since their
original enactment in 1965.276 Justice Maring pointed out that the majority
did not acknowledge that the recreational use immunity statutes were first
enacted to encourage private landowners to open their land to the public by
removing potential liability.277 Justice Maring noted that the statutes
changed in purpose when the Legislature changed the definition of land in
section 53-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code to include public and
private land.278 Justice Maring stated that the focus was no longer on
"opening" land for recreational purposes, but instead the focus was on
limiting landowner liability to when a person enters the owner's property to
participate in any sort of recreational activity. 279 Justice Maring stated that
after the court abolished sovereign immunity, the Legislature's new goal for
public lands might have been the prevention of "closing" public land that
had previously been used for recreational purposes. 280
Justice Maring determined that a close correspondence existed between
the classification and the Legislature's goal of continuing to make public
lands available for recreational use with no fee.281 She disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that voluntary participants in activities such as winter
sledding, which have natural risks and dangers, presumably consent to the
risks.282 Justice Maring determined there was no issue as to whether Olson
and Howard engaged in a recreational activity, and she believed such state-
ments made were dicta.283 The ruling had a distinct impact on the public
land users.
IV. IMPACT
North Dakota's recreational use immunity statutes impacted the
recreational user of public land, but according to the language, it did not
276. Id. (Maring, J., concurring).
277. Id. (citing 1965 N.D. Laws 337).
278. Id. T 25, 642 N.W.2d at 872.
279. Id.
280. Id. (citing Bulman v. HuIstrand Constr. Co. Inc., 521 N.W.2d 632, 633-34 (N.D. 1994)).
281. Id.




affect the nonrecreational user.284 The court overruled its prior ruling in
Hovland.285
A. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA'S RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY
STATUTES
With the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Olson, the court's
prior ruling in Hovland, which allowed an injured person to recover from
municipalities and public landowners, was overturned.2 86 Because of the
court's ruling in Hovland, North Dakota's Legislature amended the
recreational use immunity statutes to expressly limit the liability of all
owners of recreational lands.287 This new language, adopted in 1997,
distinguished the nonrecreational user from the recreational user of land. 288
The new language and decision in Olson could possibly reduce the duty of
care owed to a public recreational user.289
Recreational use immunity does not apply to suits by the
nonrecreational user, but immunity does apply to the recreational user.290
This distinction enables landowners to let the public use their lands for
recreation purposes.291  In return, the recreational user grants limited
liability to the landowner. 292 The distinction between a nonrecreational user
of land and a recreational user is justified under this rationale.293 Unlike the
recreational user, the nonrecreational user has not made a constructive
exchange of recreational use for the landowner's limited liability. 294 If
recreational use immunity was not applied to political subdivisions,
practically all recreational activities established by political subdivisions
would disappear. Political subdivisions possibly could not afford the costs
of paying for the injuries that would inevitably occur because of
recreational activities.
284. Id. 5 16, 642 N.W.2d at 870-71.
285. Id. 1 13, 642 N.W.2d at 869-70.
286. Id. at 869.
287. Id. 8, 642 N.W.2d at 867. Section 53-08-02 provides that "an owner of land owes no
duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purpose or to give
any warning." N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-02 (1999).
288. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, 8,642 N.W.2d 864, 867.
289. O'Brien, supra note 138, at 989.
290. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 53-08 (1999).
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B. NORTH DAKOTA'S APPLICATION OF OLSON
In Olson, the BPRD posted a conspicuous sign warning users to
"[silide at their own risk" and that the "BPRD was not responsible for
accidents." 295 Recreational use immunity does not allow any person using
private land or public land for recreational purposes to recover for any in-
jures suffered; people are simply left without likely recourse.296 The North
Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Olson leaves people who are injured
on public land with little chance for recovery. 297 The only chance for re-
covery rests with the public landowner's knowledge of a "willful and mali-
cious" condition, use, structure or activity. 298 It seems to be against public
policy to simply post a warning sign when it is known there is a dangerous
condition present on the land.299 The ideal solution would be for "the state
[to] maximize community well-being and minimize tort judgments." 300
A municipality is better able to bear the impact of damages ensuing
from injury than the individual. 301 The duty of a municipality to maintain
public property is general and is a duty owed to the public.302 The public
expects the municipality to take care of its members.303 It is likely that both
Olson and Howard expected such a courtesy when they used the sledding
hill that the area was safe and no danger existed or harm would result to
them.304
When a municipality is shielded by immunity, it is protected from tort
actions based on negligence and lack of due care.305 With such protection,
the result is that the municipality has no real motivation to keep its own
recreational areas safe since it is protected by immunity.306 Additionally,
municipalities can always pay for any potential liability with insurance
coverage. 307 By allowing the Legislature to determine whether a North
Dakota resident may seek judicial remedies for an injury that occurs on
public recreation areas and lands, the injured party is denied recovery and a
295. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, T 2, 642 N.W.2d 864, 866.
296. See generally Olson, 642 N.W.2d 864.
297. Id.
298. Id. 18, 642 N.W.2d at 871; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-03 (1999).
299. Carolyn Birmingham, Sovereign Immunity in Connecticut: Survey and Economic
Analysis, 13 CONN. L. REV. 293, 314 (1981).
300. O'Brien, supra note 138, at 993-94.
301. Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc., 442 N.E.2d 746, 752 (Ohio 1982).
302. Palladini v. City of East Peoria, 480 N.E.2d 530, 532 (I11. App. 3rd Dist. 1985).
303. Birmingham, supra note 299, at 314.
304. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, T 3, 642 N.W.2d 864, 866.
305. Birmingham, supra note 299, at 314.
306. Id. at 314-15.
307. Id. at 301.
[VOL. 79:529
CASE COMMENT
chance to seek judicial remedy. 308 Those in favor of recreational use im-
munity believe the public policy weighs more heavily in favor of allowing
some injuries to occur, rather than taking away all recreational activities
provided by political subdivisions 309
V. CONCLUSION
In Olson, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that municipalities are
granted immunity through the recreational use immunity statutes.310 This
was contrary to the court's prior decision in Hovland, in which it found that
immunity did not apply to public land.311 The outcome in Olson varied
from Hovland because the recreational use immunity statutes were changed
by the Legislature in 1995.312 The statutes now grant municipalities and
public landowners the same recreational immunity that the private sector
enjoys. 313 The court's decision in Olson now comports with the legislative
change to the recreational use immunity statutes. 314
Heather L. Foss
308. Olson, 1 6-7, 642 N.W.2d at 867.
309. In Harman v. City of Fostoria, No. 93WD059, 1994 WL 50259 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 18,
1994), the court determined that the recreational use immunity statutes of Ohio were an effort to
limit taxpayers' liability and upheld the statute as constitutional. Harman, 1994 WL 50259, at *2.
310. Olson, T 17, 642 N.W.2d at 871.
311. Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, 8, 17, 563 N.W.2d 384, 386-87, 388-
89.
312. Olson, 8,642 N.W.2d at 867 (citing Hovland, 2, 563 N.W.2d at 388-89).
313. Id. TT 8, 17, 642 N.W.2d at 867, 871.
314. Id. T 8, 642 N.W.2d at 867.
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